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tory appeal is inadequate or nonexistent. Tyler had the effect
of cutting off any statutory appeal upon refusal to parole, and
thus determined that such a decision could properly be appealed by writ of certiorari, subject as always to the discretion
of the court to whom the writ is directed. In effect, the court
extended the rationale of State ex rel. Johnson v. Cady,"5
wherein the court determined that revocation of probation is
appealable by writ of certiorari, and the same procedures
applying in that situation, and in fact in any writ of certiorari
review, would apply to this situation. [The reviewing court is
limited to determining: (1) whether the board kept within its
jurisdiction, (2) whether it acted according to law, (3) whether
its action was arbitrary, oppressive or unreasonable and represented its will and not its judgment; and (4) whether the evidence was such that it might reasonably make the order or
determination in question.] 6
LAWRENCE J. LASSE
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
I.

NAME OF MARRIED WOMAN

Wisconsin this term joined the small number of jurisdictions that have determined whether a woman's surname
changes to that of her husband by operation of law on marriage.I In In re Petitonof Kruze1,2 the court adopted the English
common law rule that a woman's name does not automatically
change when she marries. A married woman has the right,
under this rule, to use either her own family name or her husband's name, and a change to the husband's name occurs, if
at all, only through the wife's customary use of that name.
The petitioner, Kathleen Harney, was a teacher who at all
times after her marriage had used her family name, Harney,
rather than her husband's name, Kruzel. The case arose when
the school board demanded that for insurance purposes she
1. Application of Sara Ryan Halligan for Leave to Change Her Name to Sara Ryan,
46 App. Div. 2d 170, 361 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1974); Custer v. Bonadies, 30 Conn. Supp. 385,
318 A.2d 639 (1974); Stuart v. Board of Elections, 266 Md. 440, 295 A.2d 223 (1972);
State ex rel. Krupa v. Green, 114 Ohio App. 497, 177 N.E.2d 616 (1961); Rice v. State,
37 Tex. Crim. 36, 38 S.W. 801 (1897).
2. 67 Wis. 2d 138, 226 N.W.2d 458 (1975).
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either use her husband's name or institute court proceedings to
"change" her name from Kruzel to Harney. 3 She initiated proceedings to change her name, but the petition was denied on
the grounds that all family members should have the same
name and that the best interests of any children later born
required that husband and wife have the same name.
While the school board and the trial judge worked from the
assumption that the petitioner's name had automatically
changed from Harney to Kruzel upon marriage, the supreme
court rejected that premise, and held that the correct issue was
whether this change had ever occurred. Looking to the common
law in other jurisdictions and to Wisconsin cases and statutes,
the court concluded that the law has never held that a woman's
name changes merely because she marries. If a woman chooses
to use her husband's name and consistently does so, her name
changes through customary use, but if she customarily uses her
own family name after marriage, no change takes place. This
is an application of the common law rule that anyone may
change his name through customary use so long as the change
4
is not for a fraudulent purpose.
The only authority found by the court in support of the
proposition that a change of name occurs by law upon marriage
was an 1881 New York case, Chapman v. Phoenix National
Bank of New York,5 which said in unsupported dicta that at
common law a married woman takes her husband's name. The
court found all other cases holding that a change occurs to have
relied on Chapman. It was noted, however, that Chapmanwas
not followed in a 1974 New York case similar to Kruzel, and
that an 1823 English case held, long before Chapman, that a
married woman can have a name different from that of her
husband.7
Analyzing the Wisconsin authorities, the court found that,
although the supreme court had never before decided the issue,
several attorneys general's opinions' had stated that marriage
3. Wis. STAT. § 296.36 (1973) provides a procedure for change of name by petitioning the court.
4. 57 AM. JUR. Name §§ 1, 10 (1971).
5. 85 N.Y. 437 (1881).
6. Application of Sara Ryan Halligan for Leave to Change Her Name to Sara Ryan,
46 App. Div. 2d 170, 361 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1974).
7. The King v. The Inhabitants of St. Faith's, Newton, 3 Dowling and Ryland's
Reports 348 (1823).
8. 1906 Op. Awr'y GEN. Wis. 270; 12 Op. ATr'v GEN. Wis. 256 (1923); 13 Op. Arr'y
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does not effect a change of name and that an early case, Lane
v. Duchac,9 had held that a married woman may make a valid
contract using either her family name or her husband's name.
The court regarded these as indicating that Wisconsin has
never assumed that the husband's name is adopted upon marriage as a matter of law, stating that:
[W]e conclude, from these limited Wisconsin authorities, that the common law in Wisconsin has never ossified to
the point of holding that a wife is required to take her husband's name. The implicit assumption is to the contrary."
Various statutes referring to a change of name resulting
from marriage presented a difficult hurdle to the court in
reaching this conclusion. Cited were section 256.30(4)," which
prohibits an attorney from practicing law under a name other
than that used at the time of admission to the bar, but excepting "a change in name resulting from marriage or divorce," and
section 247.20, 12 which provides that a court granting a divorce
may, with some exceptions, allow the wife to resume her family
name. The trial judge argued that these and similar statutes
demonstrate an understanding by the legislature that marriage
causes a change of the wife's name. However, the court held
that these statutes only recognize that a change can occur if a
woman customarily uses her husband's name, not that it necessarily does.
Justice Robert W. Hansen, in a concurring opinion, agreed
that a married woman has the right to use her own name, but
questioned the policy of the particular rule adopted. He
pointed out that the customary use test set by the court seems
to make it impossible for a woman to use her family name for
some purposes and her husband's name for others, for instance,
to use her own name for business purposes and her husband's
name for personal and social purposes, and that the rule leaves
unclear the name of a woman who does so. Justice Hansen
argued that Lane v. Duchac, by recognizing the validity of a
contract made by a married woman in either her family name
GEN. Wis. 632 (1924).

9. 73 Wis. 646, 41 N.W. 962 (1889).
10. 67 Wis. 2d at 148, 226 N.W.2d at 463.
11. Similar provisions relating to other professions are found in Wis.
445.07(7), 443.01(8), 447.08(7), 446.02(6), and 448.02(4).
12. Wis. STAT. § 247.20 (1973).

STAT. §§
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or her husband's name, gave a married woman the right to use
either name or both interchangeably. 13 She is not required,
under this interpretation, to make the choice of one name or
the other apparently demanded by the majority. It was also
contended by Justice Hansen that the "concept of marriage as
a partnership"' 4 requires a single legal name for the family
unit.
The concurring opinion also agreed with the trial judge that
the statutes recognizing a change of name through marriage
indicate that a change invariably occurs, not, as the majority
held, that one may occur. Justice Hansen, although he did not
expressly state it as such, seems to feel that a woman's name
does change by operation of law upon marriage, but that she
retains the right to enjoy the use of her family name. This is
not the same conclusion that the majority reached when it
determined that a married woman's name does not change
unless she voluntarily changes it through custom, and it would
not seem to satisfy the petitioner's desire that her name be
Harney, not Kruzel.
The court in Kruzel only decided the specific question of
whether a change of name takes place if the wife has never used
her husband's name, expressly avoiding "the legal problems
that might arise were a married woman, who had assumed and
used her husband's surname, to seek to change that married
name and resume her maiden name.' 5 Under a consistent application of the rule adopted by the court, this would not appear to pose undue difficulties. Just as the wife had once
changed her name through customary use of her husband's
name, it seems that she could change it again by resuming the
use of her family name, subject only to the limitation that the
change not be attempted for fraudulent purposes.
A more difficult question is whether a change of name occurs when a married woman uses both names. If a change takes
place only through customary use, does the continued use of
the wife's family name for some purposes preclude a change of
name through custom? Perhaps the consistent use of the husband's name for some purposes will be sufficient to effect a
change without abrogating the right to use the family name as
well.
13. 73 Wis. at 654, 41 N.W. at 965:
14. 67 Wis. 2d at 159, 226 N.W.2d at 468.
15. Id. at 142-43, 226 N.W. at 460.
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PARENT AND CHILD

A.

Custody

1. Best Interests of the Child
Since 1919, when Wisconsin in Jensen v. Jensen'6 abolished
the father's common law right to custody in a divorce action
and adopted the rule that the best interests of the child determine custody, the court has steadily moved toward the position
that the best interests of the child are truly paramount to all
other considerations.' 7 In LaChapell v. Mawhinney,'8 the court

took the final step, holding that the best interests of the child
are determinative even when one of the parents is fit to have
custody.
Following a divorce in 1965, the mother had received custody of the children, two girls aged thirteen and ten at the time
of the custody action. After her death, the father and maternal
grandparents sought custody. The grandparents were able to
care for the girls, with whom they had been in daily contact
since the divorce. The father, who had been found unfit to have
custody at the time of the divorce, had rarely seen the children
thereafter and had fallen behind in support payments. The
trial court, nevertheless, determined that he had become a fit
parent since he then had an adequate home, secure income and
stable family life. Both children expressed a desire to remain
with their grandparents.
The trial court granted custody to the father, based upon
the rule of Ponsford v. Crute,19 which required that custody go
to a parent if he or she is fit. The supreme court reversed and
remanded for a determination of whether the best interests of
the children would be furthered by giving custody to the father
or the grandparents, ruling that the best interests of the child
supersede the right of a fit parent to have custody:
As a general matter, but not always, the child's best interest
will be served by living in a parent's home. However, if circumstances compel a contrary conclusion, the interests of the
child, not a supposed right of even a fit person to have
16. 168 Wis. 502, 170 N.W. 725 (1919).
17. See Greenlee v. Greenlee, 23 Wis. 2d 669, 127 N.W.2d 737 (1964); Bliffert v.
Bliffert, 14 Wis. 2d 316, 111 N.W.2d 188 (1961); Mayhew v. Mayhew, 239 Wis. 489, 1
N.W.2d 184 (1942).
18. 66 Wis. 2d 679, 225 N.W.2d 501 (1975).
19. 56 Wis. 2d 407, 202 N.W.2d 5 (1972).
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custody, should control. There well may be cases where it
would be detrimental to the best interests of the child to
award custody to a surviving spouse."0
The court attempted to reconcile its decision with Ponsford
by distinguishing the cases on their facts. The father in
Ponsford was originally found unfit because he had been
involved with another woman while still married to the mother
of the child and because he was in the military service and
unable to adequately care for the child, who was then two years
old. At the time of the Ponsford case, he had married the
woman with whom he had been involved, left the service, and
had a good job. The court in Mawhinney found the cases distinguishable on the basis of the ages of the children there involved, ten and thirteen, the fact that the father there had
rarely shown any interest in the children since the divorce, and
that he had been illicitly involved with a woman whom he later
married. Although the court in Ponsford clearly stated that the
two grounds for the finding of unfitness were the father's immoral conduct and his military service, the court in Mawhinney
never discussed the immoral conduct, stating that the only
grounds for the finding of unfitness was the father's military
service and consequent inability to care for the child.
While factual differences between the two cases do exist,
the manner in which the court in Ponsford framed the issue and
reached its conclusion makes it apparent that Mawhinney in
fact overruled Ponsford. In Ponsford, the court refused to consider whether the best interests of the child would have been
served by granting custody to the grandparents rather than the
father, discussing only whether the evidence supported a finding that the father had become a fit parent. The basis for this
approach was the ruling that a parent "cannot be deprived of
the custody of his minor child unless there is a finding that
either he is unfit or is unable to care for the child."'2' It may be
that if the court in Ponsford had considered the best interests
of the child, it would still have granted custody to the father.
Since it did not, however, it is clear that the cases cannot be
reconciled and that in Mawhinney the exactly opposite rule has
20. 66 Wis. 2d at 684, 225 N.W.2d at 503.
21. Ponsford v. Crute, 56 Wis. 2d at 413, 202 N.W.2d at 8.See also Sommers v.
Sommers, 33 Wis. 2d 22, 146 N.W.2d 428 (1966); Larson v. Larson, 30 Wis. 2d 291,
140 N.W.2d 230 (1966); Hamachek v. Hamachek, 270 Wis. 194, 70 N.W.2d 595 (1955).
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been adopted, that is, that even a fit parent can be denied
custody if the welfare of the child demands that custody be
granted elsewhere.
2. Preference for the Mother
After the abolishment of the father's right to custody in
Jensen v. Jensen,22 Wisconsin, in Jenkins v. Jenkins,23 established a strong preference for the mother when both parents
were fit. Although the strength of this rule has diminished,
with the welfare of the child becoming the controlling factor,
the Jenkins rule remained basically unchanged into the
1960's.24 In 1966, in Larson v. Larson, the court said:
The rule that the law favors the mother as to the custody of
a minor child is a strong and fundamentally natural consideration in determining custody ....11
In 1971, the legislature appeared to end the preference for
the mother when it adopted the current section 247.24(3):
In determining the parent with whom a child shall remain,
the court shall consider all facts in the best interest of the
child and shall not prefer one parent over the other solely on
the basis of the sex of the parent. 6
In Scolman v. Scolman,27 however, the supreme court held
that, despite the statute, a slight preference for the mother
remains as a matter of law.
In Scolman, a divorce case, the trial court granted custody
of a four-year-old son to the mother. It rejected the recommendations of the family court commissioner and the guardian ad
litem that custody be given to the father, holding that the rule
of law was that custody must be awarded to the mother if she
is fit. The supreme court reversed and remanded the case to the
trial court. In stating the rule to be followed on remand, the
court said that section 247.24(3) had merely codified existing
case law and that the rule remained that "other things being
2' 8
equal, there is usually a preference for the mother.
22. 168 Wis. 502, 170 N.W. 735 (1919).
23. 173 Wis. 592, 181 N.W. 826 (1921).
24. Belisle v. Belisle, 27 Wis. 2d 317, 134 N.W.2d 491 (1965); Dodge v. Dodge, 268
Wis. 441, 67 N.W.2d 878 (1955); Mayhew v. Mayhew, 239 Wis. 489, 1 N.W.2d 184
(1942).
25. Larson v. Larson, 30 Wis. 2d at 299, 140 N.W.2d at 235.
26. Wis. STAT. § 247.24(3) (1973).
27. 66 Wis. 2d 761, 226 N.W.2d 388 (1975).
28. Id. at 766, 226 N.W.2d at 390.
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It is difficult to determine whether the court meant that
there is a preference for the mother as a matter of law, or
merely that in most situations the welfare of a small child will,
as a matter of fact, best be promoted by leaving him with his
mother. There is language in the case that would seem to support the latter interpretation,29 but the court's statement that
section 247.24(3) only codifies case law makes it more likely
that it did intend that the preference for the mother be a rule
of law.
Justice Heffernan, in a concurring opinion, felt that the
majority had kept the maternal preference as a matter of law
and that this was a misinterpretation of the statute. He recommended that the statute be interpreted literally, with no preference for either parent. The test, he said, should be which
parent can better provide the "mothering function," which he
defines as giving love, care, and attention. 0
This appears to be the better construction, since the statute
in unequivocal language states that there is to be no preference
based on sex. Under this interpretation, custody would undoubtedly continue to be granted more often to the mother, not
as a rule of law but because in most instances the mother is
more able to perform the "mothering function." This would be
in line not only with the apparent intent of the legislature in
section 247.24(3), but also with the rule of Mawhinney,3 ' that
the best interests of the child, not the fitness of the parent, are
the controlling factors in determining custody.
B.

Termination of ParentalRights

In State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services,32 the

court held that the putative father of an illegitimate child can
abandon the child and thus terminate his parental rights by his
actions toward the mother before the child is born. Although
the facts of the case are unlikely to be repeated, the case is of
considerable practical importance in light of the United States
29. Id. at 764, 226 N.W.2d at 389:
[Tihe preference for the mother is not a rule of law but is only an important
element to be considered. The crucial and controlling factor is the welfare of the
child.
30. Id. at 771-72, 226 N.W.2d at 393.
31. 66 Wis. 2d 679, 225 N.W.2d 501 (1975).
32. 68 Wis. 2d 36, 227 N.W.2d 643 (1975).
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Supreme Court decision in Stanley v. Illinois3 3 that the father
of an illegitimate child cannot be denied parental rights.
Lewis has a long and complex history. When the mother of
the child informed the putative father of her pregnancy, he
immediately attempted to disassociate himself from both her
and the child. He conceded that he could be the father but
claimed that he could not be sure because he did not know how
many other men with whom she had had relations. He refused
to marry her and asked for the name of her doctor so he could
contact him to make sure his name could not be used on the
birth certificate. They separated shortly afterward. The mother
kept up a correspondence for several months, hoping to arrange
a marriage; but, when his consistent response was that there
was no reason for marriage when he did not know if he was the
father, she informed him that she was terminating their relationship and intended to put the child up for adoption.
At this point, he underwent a change of heart and began to
acknowledge paternity and propose marriage in letters that she
returned unopened. Shortly after the child was born, the
mother terminated her parental rights, and the child was
adopted. As soon as the father heard of this, he brought habeas
corpus proceedings asserting his parental rights. The petition
was denied and the decision affirmed by the supreme court 3 on
the grounds that the father of an illegitimate child has no parental rights. Following Stanley, the United States Supreme
Court reviewed the first Lewis decision and remanded it for
3
reconsideration in light of Stanley. 1
On remand, a referee found that the petitioner was the
father of the child and that he was fit to have custody, but that
it was in the best interests of the child to stay with the adoptive
parents. 6 The court held, however, that the custody question
depended on whether the father had terminated his parental
rights prior to the adoption proceedings, termination of the
natural parents' rights being a condition precedent to valid
adoption.3 7 If termination had occurred, the adoption would be
33.
34.
(1970),
35.
36.
(1973).
37.

405 U.S. 645 (1972).
State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services, 47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56
vacated 405 U.S. 1051 (1972).
Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Services, 405 U.S. 1051 (1972).
State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services, 59 Wis. 2d 1, 207 N.W.2d 826
Wis.

STAT.

§ 48.84 (1973).
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held valid. If not, the father would probably have received
custody as he had been found fit and Wisconsin was then following the Ponsford rule that a fit parent is entitled to custody
even if the best interests of the child would be served by granting custody elsewhere. 8
The case went back to the trial court for a hearing to determine whether the father's rights had been terminated. The
trial court found that they had, and the case returned to the
supreme court for review. The court affirmed. on the grounds
that the father had abandoned the child, which is a basis for
termination under section 48.40(2) (a),"9 quoting with approval
the trial court's finding:
That his repeated denials of paternity, lack of concern for
or interest in the support, care and well-being-including
prenatal care-of the child, and the disregard for the wellbeing of the child's mother from the date of the pregnancy
was announced [sic] to approximately the birthdate of the
child manifested a clear intent on the part of the petitioner,
Rothstein, to disassociate himself from responsibility for the
birth and care of the child."
The court further held that the father's attempt to acknowledge paternity did not affect the termination of rights and
that, due to the abandonment, the best interests of the child
would be served by allowing him to remain with the adoptive
parents.
The case is in part a very pragmatic response to an unusual
fact situation and the unexpected intervention of Stanley." As
such, it could be considered of little practical importance, as
the situation is unlikely to recur and because the legislature,
in line with Stanley, has amended the statutes to require that
the putative father of an illegitimate child be given notice and
38. Ponsford v. Crute, 56 Wis. 2d 407, 202 N.W.2d 5 (1972).

39. Wis. STAT. § 48.40 (1973) reads in part:
The court may, upon petition, terminate all rights of parents to a minor in any
of the following cases:
(2) If it finds that one or more of the following conditions exist:
(a) That the parents have abandoned the minor.
40. State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services, 68 Wis. 2d at 40-41, 227 N.W.2d
at 646.
41. The court in the second Lewis case, 59 Wis. 2d 1, 207 N.W.2d 826, ruled that
Stanley would be applied retrospectively only where the parents had been living in a
familial situation or where, as in Lewis, the father had attempted to assert his rights
to the child.
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an opportunity for a hearing prior to adoption and that termination of the rights of both natural parents precede adoption.42
If these procedures are followed, problems similar to those in
Lewis will not arise in most cases. Lewis does provide a workable solution, however, to the problems that could arise when
the father is unknown or cannot be located. Under the abandonment rule of Lewis, the very conduct that makes it impossible to locate or determine the father would be grounds for a
determination that he had abandoned the child before birth
and thus had terminated his rights.
The pragmatic advantages were obtained somewhat at the
expense of statutory construction. Section 48.40(2) (a) provides
that a court may terminate parental rights to a "minor" on
grounds of abandonment." Minor is defined in section
990.01(20) as "a person who has not attained the age of 18
years."" Case law in other jurisdictions has generally held that
criminal abandonment statutes do not extend to abandonment
of unborn children unless the statute expressly so provides."
The Wisconsin court has, without discussion, decided that an
unborn child is a person, at least for purposes of termination
of parental rights. Had the facts of the case been less compelling, the court might have done better to let the legislature
decide whether a father can terminate his parental rights prior
to the birth of the child.
By construing a statute referring to a "minor" as including
an unborn child, the Wisconsin court has added another facet
to the problem made salient by the United States Supreme
Court in Roe v. Wade" where, by holding that the states cannot
prohibit abortion in the first trimester, the Court in effect held
that an unborn child is not a person entitled to the fourteenth
amendment guarantees. Perhaps the only way to reconcile Roe
with Lewis and other situations in which the law treats the
unborn child as a person" is to recognize that the law, like
42. See Wis. Laws 1974, ch. 263 for amendments.
43. See note 39.
44. Wis. STAT. § 990.01(20) (1973).
45. People v. Yates, 114 Cal. App. 782, 298 P. 961 (1931); People v. Sianes, 134 Cal.

App. 355, 25 P.2d 487 (1933); McCoy v. People, 165 Colo. 407, 439 P.2d 347 (1968).
But see Bull v. State, 80 Ga. 704, 6 S.E. 178 (1888); Fairbanks v. State, 105 Ga. App.

27, 123 S.E.2d 319 (1961).
46. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
47. See Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148
N.W.2d 107 (1967), recognizing a right of an unborn child to recover in tort under some
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science and philosophy, has not yet been able to define when
life begins and is forced to decide each problem on its own facts
without trying to define a single criterion applicable to all situations.
C. Support of Adult Child
In Miller v. Miller,48 the court considered the effect of lowering the age of majority to eighteen49 on a stipulation for child
support made before the change. When the parties to the action
were divorced in 1967, they stipulated, and the court ordered,
that support would be paid "until 'further order of the court."
No age was indicated, nor was there any statement that support would be paid until the children reached majority. The
oldest child reached eighteen after the age of majority had been
lowered by the legislature. The father then ceased payment.
The mother petitioned for payment until the children reached
twenty-one, arguing that since twenty-one had been the age of
majority when the stipulation had been made, it had been their
intent that support should continue until the children reached
that age and therefore that the father was estopped, under the
rule of Bliwas v. Bliwas,5" from asserting the children's majority
as grounds for stopping support payment'
The parties in Bliwas had stipulated that the father would
pay for the child's education beyond the age of twenty-one. He
stopped payment when the child reached majority, contending
that the order was unenforceable because by statute' the court
can order payment only for minor children. The court had held
that the order was unenforceable, but that the father was estopped from asserting that defense because he had consented
to the stipulation and order.
The court distinguished Miller from Bliwas, saying that
because there was no statement in the stipulation as to the age
at which support would stop or any reference to minority, the
express language that support would continue "until further
order of the court" controlled. The reasoning was that since the
court cannot order support after majority, the father could not
circumstances, and Wis. STAT. § 700.12 (1973), allowing afterborn children to take
property given as a class gift.
48. 67 Wis. 2d 435, 227 N.W.2d 622 (1975).
49. The lowered age became effective March 23, 1972. Wis. Laws 1971, ch. 213.
50. 47 Wis. 2d 635, 178 N.W.2d 35 (1970).
51. Wis. STAT. § 247.24(1) (1973).
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have had the intent to pay after the children reached the age
of majority and thus that he was not estopped from asserting
that defense on the grounds of his intent under the Bliwas rule.
The practical lesson of the case is that if the parties to a
divorce intend support payment to continue after age eighteen,
a common situation since most parents expect to support their
children until their education is completed, the stipulation
should expressly state either an age or a level of education until
which support is to be paid. Without such specification, the
order will be unenforceable after the children reach eighteen.

Ill.
A.

DIVORCE

BilateralForeign Divorce

Following the rule of the majority of American jurisdictions, 52 Wisconsin in Estate of Steffke 53 ruled that a divorce
judgment from a foreign country of which neither party is a
domiciliary and granted on grounds not recognized in the jurisdiction of residence is invalid, even if both parties voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign country.
Priscilla and Crockett Lane were residents of Wisconsin at
the time that she went to Mexico to obtain a divorce. Both
submitted to the jurisdiction of the Mexican court, she by making a personal appearance and he through the execution of a
waiver and an appearance by an attorney. The divorce was in
full compliance with the Mexican laws, and was granted ongrounds of incompatibility of temperaments, a ground not recognized in Wisconsin. Priscilla remarried, and the case arose
during probate of her second husband's estate. The probate
court held that she was not the legal wife of the decedent because her prior marriage had not been effectively terminated.
The practical effect of the decision was that the inheritance tax
was computed at the rate applicable to strangers, rather than
at the rate applicable to surviving spouses.
The supreme court first noted that since the divorce was not
granted by a jurisdiction in the United States, there was no
obligation to recognize the divorce under the full faith and
credit clause of the United States Constitution. 4 It further held
52. See Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1439 (1967) for a discussion of recognition of divorce
judgments granted in foreign countries.
53. 65 Wis. 2d 199, 222 N.W.2d 628 (1974).
54. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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that comity would be the only alternative basis for recognition,
and that sections 247.2111 and 247.2256 compelled a decision
that the Mexican judgment was invalid in Wisconsin. Section
247.21 affirms the power of the court to recognize a divorce
granted by a foreign country on comity, but also provides that
if a Wisconsin domiciliary goes to another country to obtain a
divorce on grounds not recognized in Wisconsin, the judgment
is of no effect in Wisconsin. Section 247.22, the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act, also provides that a divorce judgment
granted by another jurisdiction is of no effect if both parties
were Wisconsin domiciliaries at the time the proceeding was
commenced.
The court held that these sections constitute a legislative
standard for determining whether comity allows the court to
recognize a divorce judgment granted by a court of a foreign
country. Since both parties in this case were domiciled in Wisconsin when the divorce action was initiated and the divorce
was granted on grounds not recognized in Wisconsin, the court
found it invalid.
In rebuttal, appellants had argued that section 247.21 was
an unconstitutional interference with the right to travel. The
court disposed of this by saying:
55. Wis. STAT. § 247.21 (1973):
Full faith and credit shall be given in all the courts of this state to a judgment
of annulment of marriage, divorce or legal separation by a court of competent
jurisdiction in another state, territory or possession of the United States, when
the jurisdiction of such court was obtained in the manner and in substantial
conformity with the conditions prescribed in s. 247.05. Nothing herein contained
shall be construed to limit the power of any court to give such effect to a
judgment of annulment, divorce or legal separation, by a court of a foreign
country as may be justified by the rules of international comity. No person
domiciled in this state shall go into another state, territory or country for the
purpose of obtaining a judgment of annulment, divorce or legal separation for a
cause which occurred while the parties resided in this state, or for a cause which
is not ground for annulment, divorce or legal separation under the laws of this
state and a judgment so obtained shall be of no effect in this state.
56. Wis. STAT. § 247.22 (1973):
(1) A divorce obtained in another jurisdiction shall be of no force or effect in
this state, if both parties to the marriage were domiciled in this state at the time
the proceeding for the divorce was commenced.
(2) Proof that a person obtaining a divorce in another jurisdiction was (a)
domiciled in this state within 12 months prior to the commencement of the
proceeding therefor, and resumed residence in this state within 18 months after
the date of his departure therefrom, or (b) at all times after his departure from
this state, and until his return maintained a place of residence within this state,
shall be prima facie evidence that the person was domiciled in this state when
the divorce proceeding was commenced.
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The situation posed in this case is unlike cases cited by
the appellants which hold unconstitutional various durational residence requirements for the purpose of gaining residency for voting or eligibility for welfare. The Wisconsin statute in question merely provides that Wisconsin domiciliaries
cannot evade or avoid the effect of Wisconsin laws affecting
they remain and continue to be domicilimarital status while
57
aries of Wisconsin.
The appellants urged the court to adopt the New York rule
that comity requires recognition of a foreign divorce decree if
both parties voluntarily submit to the foreign court's jurisdiction.5" When only one party comes under the jurisdiction of the
foreign court, New York follows the nonrecognition rule.,9 New
York, which has not adopted the Uniform Divorce Recognition
Act, rejects the concept .that domicile is essential to a valid
divorce, relying upon the fact that the residency requirements
of many liberal divorce states are mere formalities. The Wisconsin court refused to consider the "sociological wisdom"6 of
the New York rule, holding that the statutes require the decision that a bilateral foreign divorce is invalid in Wisconsin.
Although Wisconsin has not before ruled on the validity of
a "bilateral" divorce judgment granted by a court of a foreign
country, that is, one in which both parties voluntarily submit
to the jurisdiction of the foreign court, Steffke is consistent
with earlier Wisconsin decisions on divorce granted by a foreign
court. In St. Sure v. Lindsfelt," the court refused to recognize
a Swedish divorce judgment involving a couple who had immigrated from Sweden to Wisconsin some years earlier. The wife
had returned to Sweden, started divorce proceedings, and come
back to Wisconsin. The husband remained in Wisconsin
throughout and never came under the jurisdiction of the Swedish court. The divorce was granted on grounds not recognized
by Wisconsin.
2 the husband had obMore recently, in Estate of Gibson,"
tained a Mexican divorce. The wife, who was a Wisconsin dom57. 65 Wis. 2d at 206, 222 N.W.2d at 632.
58. Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel and Wood v. Wood, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86, 209
N.E.2d 709 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 971 and 383 U.S. 943 (1966).
59. Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N.Y. 371, 130 N.E.2d 902, 54 A.L.R.2d 1232
(1955); Considine v. Rawl, 39 Misc. 2d 1021, 242 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1963).
60. 65 Wis. 2d at 206, 222 N.W.2d at 632.
61. 82 Wis. 346, 52 N.W. 308 (1892).
62. 7 Wis. 2d 506, 96 N.W.2d 859 (1959).
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iciliary, never submitted to the jurisdiction of the Mexican
court. The court reasoned that since the basis of jurisdiction in
a divorce action is the domicile of at least one of the parties,
the divorce would have been void and not entitled to full faith
and credit had it been granted in another state, and, therefore,
no valid reason existed to distinguish a divorce granted in another state from one granted in a foreign country.
St. Sure and Gibson were decided before sections 247.21
and 247.22 were enacted, 3 and therefore the court in Steffke
was not required to follow them. Nevertheless, the legislative
policy expressed in the statutes was virtually the same as the
judicial policy of those cases, and it would have been most
inconsistent for the court to reject its own policy after it had
been affirmed by the legislature.
B. ContractualNature of Stipulation
The court in Vaccaro v. Vaccaro 4 clarified prior case law as
to whether a stipulation regarding alimony, support, or property settlement is of a contractual nature. At the time of their
divorce, Dr. and Mrs. Vaccaro stipulated, and the court ordered, that Dr. Vaccaro would maintain $48,000 worth of life
insurance on himself with their children designated as irrevocable beneficiaries. The order was later modified by another stipulation to require that he keep only $40,000 worth of insurance
on his life until the youngest child reached twenty-one, the
children continuing as beneficiaries.
In the instant action, Mrs. Vaccaro petitioned the court to
order Dr. Vaccaro to cash in the policies to pay for the children's education. He argued that under the second order he was
obliged only to keep the insurance until the youngest child
reached twenty-one and a cash-in would result in a substantial
increase in his obligation. Mrs. Vaccaro countered by contending that the second order was invalid because the first order,
naming the children as irrevocable beneficiaries, was contractual in nature and thus the children, as third party beneficiaries, would have had to give their consent to any modification
of the order. Since they had not consented to the second order,
it was invalid and the original order was still in force.
63. Both sections were adopted in Wis. Laws 1959, ch. 595, § 65, and took effect
January 1, 1960.
64. 67 Wis. 2d 477, 227 N.W.2d 62 (1975).

Examining Wisconsin cases on the nature of a stipulation
on which a divorce judgment or order is based, the court encountered language in Estate of Boyd 5 to the effect that a
stipulation in a divorce action was in the nature of a contract.
The court held this to be an overbroad statement of the correct
8 that unless the parties
rule, laid down in Miner v. Miner,"
make a formal agreement outside of court, a stipulation is only
a joint recommendation to the court and not a contract. While
in either case the stipulation must be approved by the court,
the difference is that the formal agreement becomes a contract
which cannot be subsequently modified by the court without
the consent of the parties and any third party beneficiaries. In
Vaccaro the court held that the stipulation was a joint recommendation and that the second order was therefore valid.
MARY
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CONSTRUCTION OF TERMS

A. "Named Insured" Clause
In Belling v. Harn,' the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered whether a separated spouse is a resident of the same
household and therefore, entitled to insurance coverage under
a "named insured" clause of an automobile liability policy.
The court found that defendant, Ruth C. Ham, was a member
of her husband's household, although at the time of the accident he was voluntarily living away from the family home following the commencement of divorce proceedings. 2 The defendant purchased the automobile in question with her own funds
after the institution of the divorce action and asked her husband to arrange for insurance. Defendant's husband simply
added the automobile to his policy which defined "named insured" to include "his spouse, if a resident of the same house65. 18 Wis. 2d 379, 118 N.W.2d 705 (1963).
66. 10 Wis. 2d 438, 103 N.W.2d 4 (1960).
1. 65 Wis. 2d 108, 221 N.W.2d 888 (1974).
2. The court specifically stated that it is immaterial whether the separation is
voluntary or court-ordered. Id. at 116-17, 221 N.W.2d at 893.

